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The Economic Implications of
Public Disability Insurance in
the United States
Patricia M. Danzon, University of Pennsylvania

A review of previous analyses of labor supply effects of Social Security
Disability Insurance (DI) concludes that estimates of labor supply
effects and net social costs are upward biased because they ignore
interactions between DI and other insurances. A model of optimal
insurance, postinjury accommodations, and labor supply shows that
reduction in labor supply and increase in consumption when disabled
do not necessarily imply moral hazard. Optimal postinjury accommodations vary inversely with firm size. The Americans with Disabilities Act will reduce wages and labor supply of healthy workers,
particularly in small firms. Effects on labor supply of the disabled are
ambiguous.
I. Introduction

Estimates of the number of disabled persons in the United States vary
because disability is not an objective medical condition. Whether or not
persons with a given medical condition consider themselves disabled and
withdraw from the labor force depends on psychological, economic, and
social factors. According to the 1988 Current Population Survey, 8.6% of
the population aged 16-64 years, or 13.4 million people, were "work disabled" in 1988.' The percent disabled increases from 3.8% of 16-24-yearl Persons are classified as having a work disability if they (1) have a health
problem or disability that prevents them from working or that limits the kind or
amount of work they can do; (2) have a service-connected disability or ever retired
or left a job for health reasons; (3) did not work in the survey reference week or
previous year because of long-term illness or disability; or (4) are under 65 and are
covered by Medicare or receive Supplemental Security Income. See U.S. Bureau of
the Census (March 1989), table 592.
[Journal of Labor Economics, 1993, vol. 11, no. 1, pt. 2]
?) 1993 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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Table 1
Persons with Work Disability, 1988
Age Total Male Female White Black Hispanic
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54

55-64

1,285

2,414
2,455
2,443

4,825

674

610

963

291

125

(3.8) (4.1) (3.6) (3.5) (6.1) (3.7)

1,249

1,165

1,874

464

189

(5.6) (5.9) (5.4) (5.2) (8.8) (5.0)

1,308

1,147

1,957

433

217

(7.1) (7.7) (6.5) (6.6) (11.7) (8.3)

1,190

1,252

1,852

502

190

(10.3) (10.3) (10.2) (9.1) (20.1) (12.8)

2,285 2,540 3,898 822 290
(22.3) (22.4) (22.2) (20.4) (39.6) (25.4)

Total 13,420 6,706 6,714 10,544 2,512 1,011

Percentage of work
disabled receiving:

(8.6) (8.7) (8.4) (7.9) (13.7) (8.2)

Social Security income 29.5 31.9 27.2 29.7 30.0 23.4
Medicaid 21.6 18.1 25.2 17.8 37.0 32.8
SOURCE.-U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989), table 592.
NOTE.-OOO omitted. Percent work disabled of total population in parentheses. Covers civilian noninstitutional population. For definition of work disability, see text. Total includes other races not shown
separately.

olds to 22.3% of 55-64-year-olds (table 1). Age-specific disability rates
are almost twice as great for blacks as for whites.2 Disability is inversely
related to schooling (Berkowitz and Hill 1986).
Disability insurance in the United States is provided through a network
of public and private programs (table 2). The Social Security Disability
Insurance (DI) program has received the most attention. Disability Insurance expenditures increased from $3.1 billion in 1970 to $20.5 billion
in 1987. However, as table 2 demonstrates, other programs have grown at
least as rapidly as DI since 1970, and it now accounts for less than 20%
of total expenditures under public or quasi-public programs. Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), a means-tested income-support program for the
aged, blind, and disabled that was established in 1974, paid out $14.8 billion
by 1987. Cash payments under workers' compensation (WC) have grown
as rapidly as DI. Even more dramatic is the growth in liability insurance
premiums, which can be viewed as a form of compulsory third party insurance. Auto liability insurance premiums were almost 2.5 times DI payments in 1987. Premiums for other liability, which includes product liability
2 In 1988 almost 30% of the work disabled received Social Security income.
There is very little difference between the percent of whites (29.7%) and blacks
(30.0%) receiving Social Security income, in contrast to the almost twofold difference
in percent reported work disabled.
3 The estimates for private insurance are downward biased because data on selfinsured plans and payments under pension plans are not available.
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Table 2

Trends in Expenditures on Disability Insurance Programs in the
United States (Current $ Billions)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1987
SSDI* 3.09 8.51 15.52 18.83 20.52
Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) 0 5.9 7.9 11.1 14.8
Workers' Compensation:t 2.0 4.6 9.7 15.1 16.75

WC total* NA NA 13.56 22.47 25.025

WC premiums 3.49 6.19 14.24 17.05 23.43
Liability insurance: 11.10 17.30 31.01 50.40 74.09
Auto liability# 8.96 13.32 23.32 36.09 49.21
Other liability** 2.14 3.98 7.69 14.31 24.88

Private insurances 1.82 2.71 5.34 5.63 6.26
* U.S. Bureau of the Census (March 1989), tables 577, 568.
t Cash payments, U.S. Bureau of the Census (March 1989), table 568.
: Cash and medical payments. Includes payments under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act,
Defense Bases Compensation Act, and Black Lung. U.S. Bureau of the Census (March 1989), table 590.
% 1986.

Premiums written.

# Excludes auto physical damage.
** Includes medical malpractice.
X Claim payments on short-term and long-term disability income loss policies by insurance companies.

Group and individual HIAA (1989). For 1970 and 1975, data on individual policies not available.

and medical malpractice, grew from $2.1 billion in 1970 to $24.9 billion
in 1987, or 20% more than payments under DI.4
Previous economic analyses of disability insurance in the United States
have focused on the effects of DI on labor force participation. One purpose
of this paper is to point out the limitations of such estimates for drawing
welfare implications. A second purpose is to analyze the effects of the more
rapidly growing form of social insurance for the disabled in the United
States: antidiscrimination legislation that requires access to employment
and public facilities and services for the disabled. The Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in any program
or activity receiving federal assistance or by the federal government. Section
503 requires businesses with federal contracts of $2,500 or more to take
affirmative action to employ and advance qualified handicapped persons
and to make "a reasonable accommodation to the physical and mental
limitations of an employee or applicant." Enforcement is through the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) of the Department
of Labor, which can sue the company on behalf of the individual; section
503 cannot be enforced by private lawsuit, unlike other sections.
Liability insurance premiums are not strictly comparable to DI benefit payments.
Liability premiums reflect the discounted present value of expected benefits payable

on policies written in the calendar year, plus overhead expenses and return on
capital. The DI benefit payments are on a pay-as-you-go rather than an accrual
basis and omit overhead costs, including deadweight costs of raising tax revenues.
Danzon (1992) discusses bias in comparing costs of public and private insurance.
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The 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act vastly expanded the potential
impact of antidiscrimination legislation. Hailed as the most sweeping civil
rights legislation since 1964, the act extends the ban on employment discrimination on the basis of mental or physical disability to all employers
with 15 or more employees by 1994 and requires access to public buildings,
telephone services, mass transportation, government, and privately provided
services such as restaurants, movie theaters, etc. Disability is defined to
include persons with AIDS or who test HIV positive and those "who may

be regarded as disabled by others." The act excludes disability related to
use of illegal drugs. Employers are required to provide "reasonable accommodation" for the disabled, although "undue burden" is a defense against
the requirement to retrofit existing buildings. In contrast to previous legislation, individuals may now bring suit on their own behalf.5
Mandating that employment and public facilities be available to the
disabled is an extension of publicly mandated disability insurance. To the
extent that the new legislation simply shifts the costs of accommodations
from the disabled to others, the effects would be purely distributive. However, the analysis below indicates that changing the liability rule is likely
to impose significant net costs and excess burdens. As a rough estimate, if
the new legislation imposed a cost of $10,000 on each of the 725,000 private
establishments with 20 or more employees,6 the cost of accommodations

to employers alone wouJd be $7.2 billion. Total costs could be much higher
if the excess burden of distortions in labor supply, costs to providers of
transportation and other services, litigation, and other overhead costs are
included.7
In this paper Section II reviews the structure of the DI program and
evidence of its effects on postdisability labor supply. Section III evaluates
the full net economic impact of the DI program incorporating insurance
and distributive effects. Section IV analyzes the effects of antidiscrimination
legislation. A theoretical model of optimal levels of disability insurance,
hours of work, and productivity-enhancing accommodations by employers
is developed. The model shows that some reduction in labor supply is
In cases involving a pattern of discrimination, the attorney general can seek
compensatory (but not punitive) damages and civil penalties of up to $100,000 for
repeated violations (U.S. Congress 1990, S933, sec. 308).
6 U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989, 1986 data, table 859.
7Advocates of the disability community argue that "a tremendous percentage
of people with disabilities really want to work and have the skills to work." Management attitude and misconceptions are cited as the major obstacles to employment.
Several studies have reported minimal additional costs for special training or facilities
for hiring the disabled (Collignon 1986). However, such studies based on voluntary
hirings are subject to severe selectivity bias as a basis for estimating the potential
costs of the new legislation, since voluntary hiring would be most likely to occur
in precisely those cases where the productivity of the disabled worker is above
average and costs of accommodation are below average.
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consistent with optimal (full information) insurance and entails no dead
weight loss, contrary to the implicit presumption of much of the literature
on DI. The extent of market failure and likely effects of governmentmandated accommodations are discussed. The paper concludes that the

excess burden, per dollar of benefit to the disabled and in total, could be
considerably greater under antidiscrimination statutes than under the Social
Security Disability Insurance program.
II. The Social Security Disability Insurance Program
A. Program Structure

The Social Security Disability Insurance Program (DI) is similar in
structure to the Canadian Disability Insurance program (see Maki, in this
issue). The DI program was established in 1956 as an amendment to the
Social Security Old Age and Survivors (OASI) Act and adopted some of
the characteristics of OASI. Eligibility is not universal but is conditioned
on having worked a minimum number of quarters in covered employment,
including immediately prior to disability. The 1965 amendments significantly expanded eligibility under the program by broadening the requirement of "permanent" disability to "expected to last at least one year," and
by extending benefits to workers under 50.
Compensation under DI follows the OASI benefit structure. The
monthly benefit is a piecewise linear function of the worker's average
indexed monthly earnings (AIME) over years in covered employment.8
Specific details of the formula, including adjustments for inflation, have
changed over the years. Since 1983, the use of wage indexing for prior
earnings, maximum taxable earnings, and for the bendponts in the formula
imply that real replacement rates (initial benefit relative to average indexed
monthly earnings) have remained constant. Dependents of beneficiaries
receive 50% of the insured's benefit, subject to a maximum family benefit.9
Since 1978, replacement rates, inclusive of other federal, state, and local

government transfers and workers' compensation, are capped at 80% of
pretax earnings. Prior to 1978, low wage workers with dependents may
have exceeded this limit, and enforcement may remain incomplete. Disability Insurance beneficiaries become eligible for Medicare after 2 years
on DI.
The DI program is financed by a payroll tax of 1.2% on wages up to
the taxable maximum (1990 rates) for employees in covered employment.
The number of covered workers has increased over time with the expansion
8 For 1990, the replacement rate is .9 ($356) + .32 ($2,145 - $356) + .15 (AIME
- $2,145).

9 Disabled dependents of covered workers who are not disabled are not entitled
to benefits unless they have established eligibility by their own work history.
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of the OASI program. Although the federal government defines the structure and financing of the program, it is implemented by state agencies.
Table 3 shows trends in the number of covered workers, beneficiaries,
and average benefit levels. The number of disabled workers receiving DI
benefits increased sharply from 1.5 million in 1970 to 2.86 million in 1980.
During the 1980s the number of DI worker beneficiaries fell initially, reflecting the tightening of eligibility requirements, but it has drifted up
slightly since the low of 2.57 million in 1983. Average monthly benefits
to disabled workers increased from $380 in 1970 to $508 in 1987; however,
this average reflects the mix of recipients and is not a pure measure of
changes in worker-specific expected benefits. If Medicare benefits paid to
DI recipients are added to these cash payment figures, the total (income
support and medical) is comparable to the $25 billion paid in workers'
compensation benefits in 1987, and the rate of growth has been similar.
However, since the number of covered workers potentially eligible for DI
has increased more rapidly than for WC, the rate of growth of beneficiaries
per covered worker has been less under DI than under WC.
Since 1974, the means-tested SSI program has provided income support
for low-income blind and disabled persons under 65. In principle, SSI
benefits are coordinated with DI benefits, with a dollar-for-dollar offset
of DI benefits. Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries are eligible for
the means-tested public medical program, Medicaid, which would cover
their medical expenses during the first 2 years on DI and (in most states)
would cover Medicare's copayments and premium contributions.
B. Evidence on Labor-Supply Effects of DI
From 1959 to 1980, the labor force participation rate of males aged 4559 fell from 96% to 88.5%. This parallels an expansion of number of covered

Table 3

Trends in Social Security Disability Insurance Recipients (Millions)
Disabled/Covered Average

Insured Disabled Disabled Workers Workers (%) Monthly

Workers* Workerst and Dependents (3 . 1) Benefit
1965
53.3
.99
1.74
1.95
...
1970 72.4 1.49 2.66 2.06 380
1975 83.3 2.49 4.35 2.99 470
1980 98.0 2.86 4.68 2.92 496
1985 109.2 2.66 3.91 2.43 511
1987

113.3

2.79

4.05

2.46

508

SOURCES.-U.S. Bureau of the Census (March 1989), tables 572, 575, 578, 579, 176; HIAA (1989), Source
Book of Health Insurance Data.
* Insured for disability.

t Disabled workers under age 65.
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Table 4
Labor Supply Effects of Social Security Disability on Males
Sample Sample
Study Data Set Size Analyzed Results
Parsons (1980a) National 3,219 Age 48-62 years Elasticity of

Longitudinal in 1969 labor force
Survey

nonparticipation
.63

Haveman and
Wolfe (1984b) Panel Study of 741 Age 45-62 years Elasticity of
Income in 1978 labor force
Dynamics nonparticipation
.06-.21

Slade (1984) Longitudinal 5,403 Age 58-63 years Elasticity of

Retirement in 1969 labor force
History nonparticipation
Survey
.81

Leonard (1979) Social Security 1,685 Age 45-54 years Elasticity of
Survey of in 1972 beneficiary status
Health
and
.35
Work

Conditions
SOURCE.-Reproduced from Leonard (1986).

workers and increase in real benefit levels under DI and probably more
lenient application of eligibility criteria. From 1968 to 1978 the number
of DI recipients grew at a rate of 7% a year.'0 Several studies have attempted
to measure contribution of DI to this decline in labor force participation
of prime-aged males (e.g., Parsons 1980a, 1980b, 1984b; Haveman and
Wolfe 1984a, 1984b; Leonard 1979). Since reviews of this literature already
exist (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981; Leonard 1986), this review
focuses on the main issues and findings, for purposes of comparison with
Canada.
While the consensus is that DI benefit levels and screening criteria affect
the number of DI recipients directly and labor force nonparticipation
(LFNP) indirectly, the magnitude of the effect remains uncertain, despite
numerous studies. Table 4 summarizes some of the main results. Estimates
of elasticity of LFNP with respect to benefit levels range from 0.06 to 0.81
and higher.
1. Methodological Issues
The range in estimates of effects of DI reflects differences in sample
(cohort effects), type of data (time series, cross-sectional, and longitudinal
10 From 1957 to 1978 the wage replacement rate under DI increased from 30%
to 41 % for the average nonsupervisory manufacturing worker with no dependents,
and from 57% to 68% for the same worker with a wife and child (Haveman and
Wolfe 1984b).
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panel), and methodologies used. None of the estimates is conclusive, largely
because of intrinsic data limitations.
The underlying model is usually a one-period model in which the worker's decision to withdraw from the labor force depends on expected utility
or income under the two alternatives:
LFNP =f(Wd,B,X),

where Wd = expected income if in the labor force, B = expected income
if out of the labor force, including DI benefits, and X = a vector of other
individual characteristics.

Life-cycle effects.-This one-period model ignores the life-cycle implications of labor force withdrawal, including depreciation of human capital
and signaling effects. Asset accumulation may also be affected because of
pension accrual. If these life-cycle losses are higher for high wage workers,
estimated effects of DI are likely to be upward biased since DI replacement
rates are inversely related to income."

Cohort effects.-If DI were actuarially fair, its effect on labor supply
would derive solely from the change in the relative price of leisure in the
two states, healthy or disabled. There would be no life-cycle income effect.
In fact, because DI benefits are financed from taxes on current workers,
the first cohorts that became eligible for benefits received a massive net
windfall. For later cohorts, the net income effect is positive only for low
wage workers, because of proportional tax financing but declining marginal
replacement rates. Thus, other things equal, larger elasticities of nonparticipation with respect to DI benefits are expected for early cohorts and
low wage workers. The estimates in table 4 are consistent with a decline
in the estimated elasticities of nonparticipation for more recent cohorts.

Unobservable wages and benefits. -A fundamental problem in estimating
labor force participation (LFP) effects of DI is that Wd is not observed
for labor force nonparticipants and B not observed for labor force participants and nonparticipants who either do not apply or are rejected. Different
studies have used different techniques to address this problem, but even
with the best possible methods applied to the available data, the resulting
estimates may nevertheless be biased, for reasons discussed below.
Identification of wage and benefit effects.-The variable B is a piecewise
linear function of average monthly earnings while working, with a declining
marginal replacement rate, 12 and most workers are on the last two segments.
Thus differences in the relationship between B and predisability wage Wa

" Sickles and Taubman (1986) include forgone OASI benefits in their analysis
of health and retirement decisions of the elderly but do not distinguish effects of
DI.

12 See n. 8 above.
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arise only as a result of differences in wage history over the working years,
dependent benefits, and truncation by the minimum and maximum family
benefit. Studies that use Wa as an instrument for Wd and impute B from
the benefit structure and Wa, rather than the individual's lifetime work
history and family status, cannot distinguish the effects of low Wd from
the effect of a relatively high replacement rate B/Wd. If the analyst's proxy
for Wd is more upward biased for low wage workers-for example, because
disability reduces productivity more in jobs requiring physical strengththen the measurement error in the predicted wage Wd is positively correlated with B/Wd and the coefficient is likely to be upward biased.

Controlfor health status. -Imperfect control for the effects of disability
on nonmarket productivity and real full income may lead to biased estimates
of the effects of B.
In empirical work, measures of health status are implicitly proxies for
nonmarket productivity. Results are sensitive to the health measures used.
A widely used dummy variable for individuals who report that disability
limits their ability to work is arguably endogenous. Lambrinos (1980)
shows that including a more comprehensive vector of health status indicators or partitioning the sample into healthy and unhealthy individuals
leads to higher estimates of the hours substitution elasticity of the disabled,
but results are very sensitive to the specification. He attributes the higher
hours elasticity of the disabled to the fact that they normally work shorter
hours: in his sample, mean hours of work for the disabled is 894 hours,
compared to 1,804 hours for the healthy.
If response to DI varies systematically with health status, then specifications that fail to control for attrition of the most disabled from the labor
force may further bias estimates.13
Asset substitution. -The fact that private long-term disability (LTD) and
private pension coverages are typically written as supplemental policies to
Social Security and other public income transfers is direct evidence that
private and public insurance are substitutes. Indeed, the low rates of LTD
and private pension coverage for low wage workers are probably attributable to the fact that DI and OASI provide replacement rates for such
workers at least equal to the maximum offered by private insurers (.60).
To the extent that DI has simply replaced private insurance, long-run
effects of DI on LFNP are overestimated. Most studies ignore private assets;
those that have included a private asset measure (e.g., Haveman and Wolfe
1984b) do not model its endogeneity. Since the displacement of private
assets is positively correlated with the DI replacement ratio B/Wd, this is
likely to bias upward the estimated effect of DI.
Omitted fringe benefits.-None of the studies controls for the value of
Medicare if the individual qualifies for DI or the expected value of private
13 Leonard (1979, 1986) demonstrates the effects of attrition bias.
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fringe benefits if the individual remains in the labor force. Since low wage
workers are less likely to receive employer-provided health insurance or
other fringe benefits, the downward bias due to using B/W as a proxy for
the full replacement rate, including noncash benefits, is greater for low
wage workers. This will further upward bias the estimated effect of DI
benefits on LFNP. The extrapolation from cross-section to time-series
effects may also be biased by omitting fringe benefits, which are an increasing share of total private compensation in the 1970s.
Expansion of OASDI coverage.-Since 1957 the under-65 population potentially eligible for DI has increased, due to expansion of covered employment, lowering the age of eligibility and adding dependent benefits.
Time-series analysis or projections of the effects of DI should distinguish
an increase in the beneficiary rate from a given pool of eligibles from
expansion of the pool. Similarly, cross-sectional studies that estimate B
from the nominal benefit structure, without control for worker-specific
eligibility, may yield upward-biased estimates of response if low wage
workers were more likely to be in covered sectors.
Expansion of Workers' Compensation and SSI.-The low probability of
being accepted for DI, at least on initial application, implies that labor
force withdrawal in the hope of qualifying for DI is a risky strategy: DI
alone has a large deductible of indefinite duration. Once on DI, there is
an additional 2-year wait for Medicare eligibility. For workers who can
show that disability is work related, this deductible is covered by workers'
compensation which pays wage loss and medical expense, with a much
shorter waiting period (typically 1 month or less) which is retroactively
restored if the disability lasts more than a certain period. The expansion
of WC coverage and increase in WC benefit levels in the 1960s and 1970s
imply a reduction in the downside risk of labor force withdrawal and
hence an increase in the expected benefits from LFNP. Similar effects are
implied by the introduction of SSI in 1974, which provides means-tested
benefits for the disabled and eligibility for Medicaid. In cross-sectional
analysis, failure to control for WC and SSI would bias upward estimates
of DI effects, since WC replacement rates and SSI benefits are positively
correlated with the DI replacement rate.'4
2. Empirical Estimates

Parsons (1980a) estimates a cross-sectional labor force participation
equation for 1969, using a sample of 3,219 men from the National Longitudinal Survey who were 45-59 in 1966. Explanatory variables are proxies
14 In most states, the nominal WC replacement rate is truncated by a minimum
and a maximum benefit; the maximum benefit implies sharply declining replacement
rates at higher wage levels and in some states is binding for all workers above the
average wage.
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for DI benefits and other welfare benefits, both measured relative to an
estimated wage; an index of mortality between 1969 and 1976, as a proxy
for health status; age; and unemployment. Since 1969 wages are not observed for nonparticipants, Parsons uses 1966 wages as a proxy for 1969
potential wages and omits persons not in the labor force in 1966. The 1966

wage is also used to construct an estimate of B, using DI benefit tables.
Parsons estimates an elasticity of nonparticipation with respect to the
replacement rate of 0.63. Applying the coefficients from the cross-section
regression to changes in the dependent variables over time, Parsons concludes that DI can explain much of the decline in labor force participation
of 45-54-year-old men between 1950 and 1980, and differences between
blacks and whites.
These estimates of the effects of DI are likely to be upward biased for
reasons already mentioned, several of which are recognized by Parsons.
First, using Wa when working as a proxy for potential wage when disabled
Wd is likely to introduce measurement error that is proportionately greater
for low wage workers and is therefore correlated with B/Wd. Second, by
the construction of B, all variation in the ratio B/Wd reflects variation in
the potential wage. The moral hazard effect of high B/Wd cannot be distinguished from the effect of low Wd. Third, failure to control for private
assets, WC, Medicare, and DI eligibility may all induce upward bias. As
Parsons notes, the elimination of those not in the labor force in 1966, who
might also be the most severely disabled, may also lead to upward-biased
estimates of response.
Some evidence to support the hypothesis that Parsons's estimated elasticity is upward biased comes from John Bound's (1985) study of a sample
of nonapplicants from the 1972 Social Security Survey of Disabled and
Non-Disabled Adults. Using a similar specification applied to the nonapplicants, whose behavior is unlikely to reflect the influence of DI (unless
they anticipated applying for DI later), Bound estimates an elasticity of
0.88, higher than Parsons's 0.63 estimate.
Haveman and Wolfe (1984b) use a sample of 741 men aged 48-62 from
the 1978 Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They use a composite
measure of disability income, which includes DI, SSI, and other public
transfers and veterans and other disability pensions, which presumably
includes private pensions. There is no attempt to distinguish net effects of
DI. They use a three-step estimation procedure, following Lee (1979). The
first step is a probit equation for labor force participation that does not
include measures of expected income in and out of the labor force. This
is used to impute a selectivity correction that is used in the potential earnings
and disability income equations. At the third step the predicted incomes
from these equations are included in a probit equation for predicting labor
force participation. This technique requires the very strong specification
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and identification assumptions, that some variable affects W and B but not
labor force participation. 5
The resulting elasticities for labor force nonparticipation range from .06

to .21; the lower estimates are obtained when additional controls are added
for dependent benefits, selectivity, occupation, and other household income.
The estimated response is extremely nonlinear, with higher elasticities for
the more disabled and low wage earners. Although the elasticity of labor
force participation with respect to disability income calculated at sample
means is very low (between -.0003 and -.0005), their simulations (Haveman and Wolfe 1984b, table 5) imply that a 25% increase in expected
disability income would increase the disability recipiency rate by 1.04 percentage points or an elasticity of 0.55.16

Slade (1984) analyzes a sample of men aged 58-63 from the 1969 Longitudinal Retirement History Survey. Wages for nonparticipants are imputed from a wage equation using a sample selection correction, and an
earnings history is used to impute DI benefits. He finds an elasticity of
nonparticipation with respect to DI benefits of .81, and .90 when the sample
is restricted to those with self-reported health limitations, higher than
Parsons's (1980a) estimate of .63. Note that this is consistent with the

hypothesis of a larger income effect for earlier cohorts.17 Again, the estimates are suspect because of the difficulty of imputing a potential wage
for the disabled and the intrinsic correlation between high DI replacement
rates and low potential wages.18
Leonard (1979) uses a sample of 1,685 men aged 45-54 from the 1972
Social Security Survey of Health and Work Characteristics, merged with
the Social Security earnings history, to estimate the effect of expected DI
benefit levels on the probability of DI recipiency. The structural model is
SSDK = F(SSD, W, X) + e,
W = Zb + u,

15 As Leonard (1986) points out, application of a Heckman selectivity correction
is more complex in this context because it requires estimating the probability of
observing a positive wage, which is closely related to estimating the probability of
not being a DI recipient, which is what is ultimately to be measured.
16 See Bound (1985) and Leonard (1986) for discussion on this. Note that elasticities of LFNP with respect to benefit levels may differ from elasticities of recipiency rates.
1 Optimal investment in human capital would also predict larger effects for
older age groups. In order to distinguish pure age (human capital) from cohort
(income) effects it would be necessary to compare age-specific elasticities for different cohorts.
l Use of actual earnings history does not necessarily reduce the correlation because

earnings history reflects both actual wages while working and intermittent preapplication labor force participation, which may indicate poor health and low
potential wage once disabled.
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and
p = Hg1 + Xg2 + m,
where
SSDK = probability of being a DI recipient,
SSD = expected DI benefits = p X B,

W = expected labor market income,
p = probability of eligibility,
H = health status,
X, Z = vectors of individual background characteristics, and
e, u, m = error terms.
Leonard forgoes identification of the coefficient of W in the beneficiary

equation, using indirect least squares:
SSDK = F(SSD, Zb + u, X) + e.

Expected DI benefits (SSD) are estimated as the product of de jure benefits
if eligible (based on actual earnings record and number of dependents)
and the probability of eligibility which is estimated from the third equation
using a sample of recent applicants. As Leonard (1986) points out, the
coefficient on this variable may be upward biased if errors in the eligibility
and beneficiary equations are positively correlated. Health status is measured by a set of 27 dummy variables for specific health conditions.
Leonard estimates that a $180 increase in annual benefits will increase
the proportion of DI beneficiaries in the population by one percentage
point, or an elasticity of 0.35. The probability of being a beneficiary is
negatively related to education and to having predisability wages above
the ceiling. He attributes this to greater job opportunities for partially
disabled white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers. He concludes
that the probability of eligibility is significantly lower for nonwhites.
However, given the lower expected benefits corresponding to a given level
of de jure benefits, race has no effect, after controlling for job opportunities
and poor health. Applying these cross-section estimates to the time-series
data, Leonard estimates that DI accounts for roughly half of the decline
in male labor force participation between 1957 and 1975 or 1.8 of the 3.5
percentage points. Although Leonard's estimates are probably the most
reliable, given the available data, the potential for upward bias remains,
given the difficulty of distinguishing net effects of DI and other correlated
factors.

If the cross-section evidence is discounted because of problems of distinguishing DI effects from those of low wages, what other factors might
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explain the decrease in LFP, other than the simultaneous increase in number
of DI beneficiaries? Leonard (1986) rejects arguments based on changes
in marital status, structural unemployment, weak prior labor force attachment, veteran status, and increase in wives' labor force participation. Other
possible contributing factors, which are not explicitly included in these
studies, are the growth in WC benefit levels and duration of coverage for
permanent total disabilities, the introduction of SSI and Medicaid, and
private LTD and pensions benefits. In particular, the sharp increase in DI
recipiency rates between 1970 and 1975 may have been stimulated by introduction of SSI and the sharp 1972 increase in DI benefit levels, including
a flaw in the indexing adjustment which created strong incentives for early
retirement. Since this error was recognized but not corrected until 1977,
there would have been an incentive to take advantage of a benefit structure
that was temporarily higher than might be expected for the long run. The
transitory effects of these events should be distinguished from the permanent effects of DI.

More recent experience suggests that screening stringency as well as
benefit levels contribute to the DI applicancy rate and hence to the declining
LFP of prime-aged males. Since 1980, the number of DI recipients has
remained stable or even fallen, despite a modest increase in average monthly
DI benefit levels (see table 2).i9 The decline in DI recipiency rates in the
early 1980s partly reflects tightening of the screening process under the
Reagan administration. Several studies have demonstrated the sensitivity
of DI applicant rates to the acceptance rate. Marvel (1982) finds that crossstate differences in application rates are related to denial rates. Halpern
and Hausman (1986) confirm that the probability of application is sensitive
to the denial rate but conclude that "potential applicants seem more sensitive to the benefit level than to the probability of acceptance." None of
these studies has attempted to measure the extent to which growth in
recipiency in the 1970s reflects a looser screening process as opposed to
increased benefit levels.
Given the intrinsic difficulties in estimating directly the contribution of
DI to the decline in labor force participation, other indirect evidence has
been brought to bear. Several studies have looked at the work history of
rejected applicants. Treitel (1976) found that 39.7% of male applicants
who were initially denied benefits in 1967 did not work at all in the subsequent 4 years, and only 24.1 % worked for 12 or more of the 16 quarters.
Bound (1985) studied a sample of rejected applicants from the 1972 Survey
of Disabled and Non-Disabled Adults and the 1978 Survey of Disability
and Work. He finds that the majority of rejected applicants do not return
to sustained work. Less than 50% were earning at any given time, with
19 As noted earlier, the DI benefit structure has remained constant in real terms
since 1983.
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yearly earnings for those who worked less than half of the earnings of
other working men their age. Assuming that rejectees would on average
be in better health than successful applicants, he concludes that DI accounts
for at most 1.75% of the 4.25% of men aged 45-54 who were out of the
labor force, much lower than estimates based on extrapolation from crosssectional analyses. Halpern and Hausman (1986) note that, while 7.7 million adults between ages 20 and 64 report that they were unable to work
or unable to work regularly, only 26% received DI benefits.20 Of course,
because the application process is uncertain and the outcome depends on
demonstrated inability to work, the number of actual DI recipients may
understate the number whose labor force withdrawal is influenced by the
potential for DI.2'
3. Conclusions

It seems safe to conclude that DI has contributed to the decline in LFP
of males, but the magnitude of the effect remains uncertain, as does the
relative importance of the dollar benefits and the stringency of the screening
process. The failure to resolve this issue reflects inherent limitations of the
data available, not defects in the analytic methods used. The evidence
strongly suggests that DI is subject to type I and type II errors-acceptance
of some who could work and rejection of others who cannot. Even if DI
does have a significant effect on LFP, measurement of the productivity
loss should not simply extrapolate from productivity of able-bodied workers. Both theory and empirical evidence confirm that those most affected
have relatively low potential wages even prior to disability. Further, the
disabled who do work report average annual hours and yearly earnings
that are less than half the annual hours and earnings of the nondisabled.
Assuming that those who continue to work have higher potential wages
and hours than those who drop out, this would be an upward-biased estimate of the loss in output due to labor force withdrawal of those on DI.
III. Net Economic Effects of DI

Although most prior studies of DI have focused on its effect on labor
force participation, a full evaluation of the economic impact of DI must
also consider its effects on insurance, incentives for injury prevention,

postinjury investments to raise productivity of the disabled, and overhead
costs including labor supply distortions from the payroll tax levies.22 Mea20 In 1987 30% of the work disabled received some form of Social Security; this
overstates DI recipiency rates since it includes those 62-64-year-olds who received
OASI benefits (see table 1).
21 For example, in 1980 35.7% of successful DI recipients had been rejected on

their initial application.

22 In addition, there may be a distortion from substituting pay-as-you-go financed
DI insurance for funded private insurance. The effects of Social Security on capital
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surement of the overall welfare effects of DI must also address the prior
question, Relative to what?
It is not practical or relevant to compare DI to the first best full information optimum. One possible benchmark is the outcome with no gov-

ernment intervention and reliance on private insurance markets, unconstrained by government but subject to imperfect information which may
result in adverse selection, predisability moral hazard (not taking care),
and postdisability moral hazard (exaggerating disability status). For any
individual, the net cost of DI (Cdi) is then the difference between expected
utility under DI and private insurance:23

Cd = EU[B(DI), t(DI), r(DI), s(DI), h(DI)] - EU[Bp, p, rp, sp, hp],
where t = DI tax rate, r = prevention expenditures, s = postinjury investments, h = hours of work, subscript p denotes optimal values under
private insurance, conditional on imperfect information, and X denotes
the private disability insurance premium.
As already noted, WC and private insurance and pension contracts are
explicitly written as supplements to DI.24 To the extent that DI simply
substitutes for equivalent other insurance, there are no net welfare effects,
and econometric estimates of the labor supply effects of DI that do not
control for endogeneity of other insurance are upward biased. Although
these may be unbiased estimates of the effects of disability insurance more
generally, no welfare loss is necessarily implied, relative to either a full
information or an information-constrained optimum.25
In fact DI differs from private insurance in several ways that must be
considered in a full evaluation. First, the social welfare function may place
some value on DI's intragenerational redistribution from workers with
high lifetime earnings to workers with low lifetime earnings.26 Second,
formation remain an unresolved issue (see, e.g., Feldstein 1974, 1982; Leimer and
Lesnoy 1982).

23 A third possible benchmark is the best feasible mixed public-private program,
given information and administrative cost constraints but ignoring political constraints.

24 The most plausible explanation for upper limits on duration or dollar benefits
for permanent total disability, under WC and private LTD policies, is the high
probability that the individual will have qualified for DI by the time the limit is
reached.

25 Measuring relevant private insurance coverage is not easy. Many individuals
would not know the details of their LTD and private pension coverages. For defined
contribution plans, asset value is the market value of the individual's contribution
and is unaffected by the timing of withdrawal from the labor force. But the present
value of defined benefit plans may be greater, the earlier the withdrawal from the
labor force.
26 The redistributional effects of DI are greater than those of OASI, although
they have identical financing and benefit structures, because high wage workers
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casual evidence suggests that the risk of adverse selection constrains the
coverage available in the nongroup market for LTD coverage and raises
its cost. If private insurance markets are quantity constrained because of
adverse selection, mandating a minimum level of universal coverage while
permitting individuals to purchase supplementary coverage can be Pareto
improving.27

Another advantage of DI relative to most private LTD coverages is that
DI benefits are indexed. As long as private insurance markets do not offer
fair indexed annuities, the utility value of public insurance programs such
as OASI and DI which do provide indexed annuities exceeds their actuarial
value Bernheim (1987).28
On the other hand, some characteristics of DI entail excess burdens
compared to private insurance. Since DI tax levies do not experience rate
industries or employers, in contrast to group LTD or WC, DI undermines
employers' incentives for injury prevention and postinjury rehabilitation
and distorts relative prices and industrial mix.29 Second, if individuals for
whom DI is unfair do not value the redistribution, the difference between

their tax contributions and expected benefits should be viewed as an effective tax ,30 with associated tax-induced deadweight costs.

Third, for low wage workers B(DI) may exceed the optimal level Bp,

given moral hazard, and public insurance has no information advantage
over private insurance to control moral hazard. Since 1978, DI benefits
(including dependents' benefits) combined with workers' compensation
and other governmental disability benefits cannot exceed 80% of "average
current earnings," which for most workers is the average monthly earnings
for the highest year in the 6 years covered employment immediately prior
to disability.31 However, even if B(DI) is less than full replacement of
after-tax income plus fringe benefits prior to disability, it may considerably
exceed potential after-tax earnings after disability, if disability reduces potential wage rates. This is not necessarily inconsistent with first best insurance under full information (see below), but is more likely to be excessive under imperfect information and moral hazard. Although optimal
disability benefits under imperfect information cannot be determined a

are less likely to claim disability benefits, whereas they have higher expected duration
of retiree benefits.

27 mandatory coverage could be privately or publicly provided.

28 However, OASI and DI do not necessarily provide the optimal intergenerational
allocation of nondiversifiable risk.
29 For an analysis of the industry mix component of deadweight costs induced
by flat rating in the Swedish social insurance scheme, see Hansson, Lyttkens, and
Skogh (1984).
3 See Browning (1985) for estimates of the effective OASI tax rate.
31 This does not include income from private insurance. Private insurers typically

set a .60 cap on the replacement rate, including benefits from all sources.
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priori, the fact that most private insurance coverage sets a cap of twothirds or less suggests that B (DI) for low-income workers exceeds efficient
levels, given moral hazard. The labor supply effects of this excess coverage
above information-constrained efficient levels can be considered a net cost
of DI or a trade-off between efficiency and equity.32
Finally, applicant screening and periodic review may be less efficient
under DI than with private insurance. Since applicant screening occurs at
the state level whereas funding is fully from federal sources, most plausible
models of bureaucratic decision making would predict a bias toward excessive acceptance rates, given the information available. Screeners are likely
to attach a higher cost to rejection of valid applicants than to acceptance
of invalid applicants.33
To get some indication of the net welfare effects of DI, consider a simple
case where r and s are unaffected by the insurance program. A worker
faces an exogenous risk of disabilityp that entails a loss of income. Expected
utility in the absence of insurance is

EU = ( 1 -p) U(Y a) + pU(Y d).
With the introduction of DI, the worker pays a proportional tax on labor
income at rate t. If he becomes disabled, assume that the choice of continuing to work and earning income yd is dominated by withdrawal from
the labor force, receiving benefit B and an increase in leisure. This gives a
lower bound for the utility value derived from the option of labor force
withdrawal offered by the DI program. The net change in utility from the
introduction of DI is:

(1 p)U(Ya - twaha) +pU(yd + B - k) -(1 p)U(Y a) p U(y d),
where

ha = hours of work if healthy,
wa = wage rate if healthy, and
k = the reduction in labor income due to withdrawal from the labor
force, net of the dollar value of the increase in leisure.

With actuarial insurance, pB = (- p)twh (ignoring discounting). If the
individual were risk neutral, the net loss is -pk, where k is the earnings
loss due to postinjury reduction in hours of work, net of the dollar value
of increased leisure. Econometric estimates of the DI-induced earnings loss
32 Some studies, e.g., Leonard (1986), implicitly assume that all insurance-induced
reduction in labor supply is a trade-off between efficiency and equity.
3 See Mashaw (1988).
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would overstate the net cost of DI by the value of increased leisure to the
disabled.

But for risk-averse individuals, pk overstates the loss in money-equivalent
expected utility because of the risk premium for insurance protection and
because the optimal insurance policy may include some reduction in hours
of work, even under full information (see below). With imperfect infor-

mation and some moral hazard, optimal benefits Bp would equate, at the
margin, the utility cost of excessive reduction in h with the utility gain
from increased protection (Zeckhauser 1970). Thus for workers for whom

Bdi ' Bp, we can assume that any deadweight costs in the postinjury labor
market are at least offset by the utility value of risk reduction and increased
leisure.

In summary, for workers for whom Bdi < Bp, an upper bound on the
cost of the DI program is the excess burden induced by the effective payroll
tax,34 for those for whom DI levies are less than fair, plus any distortions
in injury prevention and rehabilitation due to lack of firm-specific expe-

rience rating. For workers for whom Bdi> Bp, there is an additional excess
burden due to reduction in postinjury labor supply. Against these gross
costs must be offset any gains from indexed benefits; better protection for
those who would have been suboptimally insured in a pure private insurance
market because of adverse selection or myopia; elimination of free riding
and costs associated with the Samaritan's dilemma;35 and any value assigned
to the redistributive effects of DI.
IV. Optimal Disability Insurance, Labor Supply, and the

Effects of Antidiscrimination Laws

It is often implicitly assumed that the reduction in labor supply associated
with disability insurance results from moral hazard and entails an excess
burden. Contrary to this presumption, the model developed here shows
that some postdisability reduction in labor supply is consistent with optimal
(full information) disability insurance. The model also shows the interdependence between optimal insurance and optimal postinjury investment
in "accommodations" of the type mandated by the 1990 Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The likely efficiency and distributive effects of
the ADA are discussed.
Assume that a worker faces a probability p of suffering a partially disabling injury that reduces market productivity. Disability may also reduce
nonmarket productivity, raising the time and goods required to produce
consumption commodities, and change the relative marginal utilities of
work and consumption.
3 Nominal tax rate minus expected benefits.
3 I am indebted to Steve Coate for this point.
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The wage if healthy is wa; if disabled it is wd, with wd < Wa. Postdisability
wage Wd can be raised by investments (s) with constant unit marginal cost,
such as readers for the blind or other special equipment, up to a limit given
by the predisability wage: wed > 0 and wd(s) < w4. If insurance is available,
assume initially that the insurer can costlessly observe the true state of the
world, including wd and s, such that the premium is actuarially fair. With
full information, insurance is payable on the occurrence of disability and
need not be conditioned on labor force withdrawal. Insurance coverage is

expressed as a percentage g of the monetary disability-related loss B, which
includes wage loss and expenses s. The worker chooses hours of work, h a
and hd, postinjury expenditure on s, and insurance coverage g to maximize
a Von Neumann Morgenstern concave utility function, which depends

directly on consumption of composite commodities Z, and indirectly on
money income Y, nonmarket time L, and the parameters of the production
function of Z:

max EU = (1 -p) Ua { Z a[Waha - gpB, La]}

hahdsg

(1)

+ pUdZ d{ [Wd(Z)hd - gpB + gB -s Lsd]
where

B = waha - wdhd + s.
The first-order conditions for an interior maximum imply

UaZaWa - gpWa(UaZ a - UdZd) = UaZa, (2)
UdZ d Wd + (1 p)gWd(UaZ a U dZ d) = ud Z d (3)

(wshd - 1)[UdZd + (1 -p)g(UzaZ - UdZd)] = 0, (4)
and

UaZ;a = UdZ . (5)
We are interested in the effect of disability on hours of work and s under
various possible assumptions.

A. Wd < Wa, No Aids (s = 0), No Insurance (g = 0)
Consider first the case where disability lowers market productivity, and
postinjury aids (s) and insurance are unavailable. The first-order conditions
for ha and hd imply that the wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution
between income and nonmarket time in each state:
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wi = Z'IZ' i = a, d.
The effect of disability on hours of work is theoretically indeterminate.
Assume initially that nonmarket productivity is unaffected and utility is
state independent. Without insurance, the reduction in market wage (wd
< Wa) has both an income and a substitution effect: hd < h a if the substitution of time for goods in nonmarket production outweighs the income
effect. But if disability also reduces the productivity of nonmarket time,
the substitution effect is weakened and if Z 1/Z ' < d/wa, the substitution
effect operates to increase hd. A decrease in h is more likely if disability
adds fixed time costs of work (e.g., transportation becomes more difficult),
raises the marginal disutility of work (work becomes more painful), or if
discrimination reduces market opportunities.

B. W. ? 0, Wd(S) < Wa, No Insurance Available
Now consider the case where investment in s can raise wd, with w d > 0

Wd(S) < Wa. The first-order condition (eq. [3] but with g = 0) implies
that the worker makes the income-maximizing postinjury investment in
aids, even though he bears the full marginal cost and is uninsured:
w5hd = 1.

The optimal s * depends not only on w s but also on hd. Comparative statics
shows that 8s */8wd and 8hbd*/8Wd > 0: workers for whom wd at s = 0 is
relatively high, will optimally invest more in s, which in turn raises wd*

and hd*. In this respect s is like any investment in human capital. The
availability of s makes cross-sectional estimates of labor supply of the disabled more elastic.

C. Wd(s) < Wa, Fair Insurance Available
With fair insurance available, equation (5) implies the standard result,
that optimal coverage equalizes the marginal utility of money income in

both states: UzZa = Uz Zy With state-independent utility and no effect
on nonmarket productivity, this implies g = 1, that is, optimal insurance
provides full replacement of wage loss and disability-related expenses:
B= w aha* - wdhd* + s*,

that is, optimal insurance compensates for earnings reduction due to loss

of productivity per hour and reduction in hours of work. If disability
lowers productivity of nonmarket time or goods, optimal insurance exceeds
full coverage of wage loss and work-related expenses s, that is, g > 1. Of
course, if insurance is not perfectly experience-rated because the insurer
cannot observe ex ante the individual-specific probability of disability or
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control moral hazard ex post, then optimal coverage subject to available

information g* * is less than g Note that Z' is the inverse of the price
per unit of Z, wW + xi, where t' and x are the endogenous input of time

and goods per unit of Z, respectively. If disability reduces market productivity more than nonmarket productivity, Za < Z ', that is, disability
reduces the price per unit of Z. Then since Uaz = Uz'Z', it follows that
Ua > Uzd and Zd > Z , that is, total consumption of Z is higher when
disabled.
Comparing the first-order conditions for hd and ha, with and without
fair insurance, shows that hd will be lower if insurance is available. Necessary conditions for optimal allocation of time, with or without insurance,

imply that Z d = wdZ d. Since fair insurance reduces Z d, Z d must also fall,
that is, the availability of fair insurance reduces labor supply when disabled,
relative to when insurance is not available.
With fair insurance, the worker makes the income-maximizing investment in s (wdhd = 1). This is the standard result, that fair insurance with
perfect observability does not interfere with loss prevention.
Two important conclusions follow from this analysis. First, hd * < ha *,
that is, the availability of insurance is likely to reduce optimal hours of
work when disabled, even when the insurer has full information (no moral
hazard) and insurance is actuarially fair. This has important implications
for interpreting the effects of DI on labor force participation. Despite the
reduction in hd, expected utility is unambiguously higher when insurance
is available. Estimates of the excess burden of DI are upward biased if
based on the assumption that all insurance-induced reduction in hours of
work by the disabled is nonoptimal.

Second, if the utility function is state independent and disability does
not reduce nonmarket productivity, then with fair insurance the worker
is actually better off when disabled: he has full insurance which equalizes
monetary income, works shorter hours, and has higher consumption when
disabled.36 This implies that workers have strong incentives to fake disability
or even incur minor disability. If disability reduces nonmarket productivity
or the marginal utility of consumption, then the incentive to incur disability
is reduced but the incentive to fake is not. Thus the correct measure of the
excess burden of DI should include only this moral hazard effect, not the
optimal insurance-induced reduction in labor supply.
D. The Firm as a Potential Insurer

Inability of private insurers to observe hd, s, and ws does not undermine
the feasibility of a first best optimum for insurance and investment in s if
premiums are individually fair. In that case the cost of decisions with
respect to hd or s are borne by the worker, and incentives for first best
36 I am indebted to Gary Becker for emphasizing this point to me.
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choices are preserved. However, if insurance is not individually fair because
the insurer lacks perfect information about p ex ante (adverse selection)
or cannot observe the true state of disability ex post (moral hazard), then
a first best is not achievable. Controlling ex post moral hazard may be
particularly problematic because, as shown above, the optimal insurance
contract provides for a higher level of consumption when disabled, which
creates incentives to fake or even incur minor disability provided that
disability does not seriously reduce the productivity of nonmarket time or
the marginal utility of consumption. If employers can better observe the
true state of disability, then employer-provided disability insurance through
long-term contracts may be superior to individually purchased coverage.
This section therefore analyzes the optimal form of employer-provided
LTD coverage.37
Assume that a firm employs N homogeneous workers. Each worker
faces a probability p of suffering a partially disabling injury. Disability

reduces market productivity, R, such that Rd < Ra. Assume initially that
all workers work a fixed number of hours, that is, we abstract from the
labor force participation and hours of work decisions and from effects of
disability on nonmarket productivity. Productivity of disabled workers
can be increased by investment in two types of aid: s is a variable input
per disabled worker (such as a reader for blind workers) and x is fixed
input costs that are incurred if any disabled workers are employed but are
invariant to the number of disabled workers (e.g., providing ramps for
wheel chairs). The cost per unit of s and x is 1; R(x, s) is assumed to be
quasi concave, with Rx_ > 0.
In competitive labor markets, the long-term employment contract offered
implies a choice of s, x, and wage rates for healthy and disabled workers
that maximizes the expected utility of the typical worker, subject to an
overall break-even constraint:

max EU = (1 - p) U(wa) + pU(wd)
waWd S X

+ gJ{Na(Ra - Wa) + Nd[Rd(Z, X) - Wd - S] -X
where Na is the number of healthy workers, Nd is the number of disabled
workers, and p. is a Lagrange multiplier. With a long-term contract, the

relative number of healthy and disabled workers Na/Nd will correspond
to the underlying odds ratio of becoming disabled, (1 - p)/p. First-order
conditions imply:
U=

U%

m,

(6)

37 Control of adverse selection and economies of scale in administration are additional reasons why most LTD coverage is in fact obtained through employment.
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Rs + Rxs = 1, (7)
and

RX + R, = 1 /Nd. (8)
Equation (6) implies that the firm acts as a mutual insurer and provides
optimal risk sharing among workers. If disability does not affect the marginal utility of income, wages are equal regardless of disability status: Wa
= wd = z. The common wage rate depends on average productivity, and
each worker bears a prorata share of the cost of aids, x and s, each set at
revenue- (and utility-) maximizing levels:

W= (N-/N)R- + Nd/N(Rd - s)-x/N.
Not surprisingly, the utility-maximizing investment in the fixed component
x varies inversely with the number of disabled workers. The common wage
rate therefore also varies inversely with Nd . One implication is that if firms
offer long-term contracts, small firms that have disabled workers would
not be able to compete with larger firms, in the absence of other offsetting
advantages.
E. Short-Term Contracts

If the labor contract does not provide for any guarantee of continued
employment if the worker becomes disabled, then competitive spot labor
markets will yield contracts that maximize the utility for each worker type,
subject to separate break-even constraints:
W a= R a

Wgd = Rd - S - x/Nd,

Rs + Rxs = 1,
and

RX + R, = 1/Nd.
Investment in x and s is still at revenue-maximizing levels, but the full
incidence of the cost is on disabled workers. Thus spot labor markets

provide suboptimal insurance against the risk of becoming partially disabled. A further implication is again that, to the extent that optimal investment in productivity-enhancing equipment entails fixed cost, com-
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petition will lead to specialization, with some firms hiring a relatively large
number of disabled workers and other firms hiring none. This is an efficient
distribution of employment of the disabled, in that it maximizes their net
income, although it may appear to involve "discrimination."38
F. Hours Variable and Insurance Available
Since long-term contracts provide better insurance for workers, consider
now the optimal long-term contract when hours are variable and insurance
is also available. The firm now chooses w, s, and x to maximize the worker's
expected utility, subject to the additional constraint that a worker selects
h to maximize a utility function over income and nonmarket time in each
state and an overall break-even constraint for the firm. Define R, s, and
w to represent hourly rates:

max EU= (1 -p)U[Z(wahaLa)] +pU[Z(Wdhd + B, Ld)],
wa, d, B,s,x

subject to
Na(Ra - wa)ha + Nd[(Rd(s, x)- wd)hd - s - B] - x 0,
and

ZyiW= Zi' i=a,d.
First-order conditions for wi are

(UZY - X)ht + X(R - wt)h = 0, i = a, d,
where k is the Lagrange multiplier of the break-even constraint. The optimal
level of B implies

which in turn implies that the optimal wage of the disabled is equal to

their marginal revenue product, Rd(s5, x*) = wd*. Substituting in the
break-even constraint implies

w= R [p(s + B) + x]/(1 - p)ha.
38 In this simple model, efficiency is equivalent to income maximization. If the
disabled derive disutility from working in firms with a large number of other
disabled workers, this would constrain the optimal degree of specialization below
the wealth-maximizing level. However equal distribution of the disabled across all
firms would be optimal only if the marginal rate of substitution between income
and "equal employment opportunity" were zero for disabled workers.
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Thus healthy workers are paid less than their marginal revenue product
in order to cover the expected costs of insurance and accommodations if
disabled. But in contrast to the case where hours of work are fixed, the

optimal contract does not fully insure money income of the disabled if
hours supplied by the healthy increase with Wa:

UZ = UZ 1 Ehawa[p(s + B) + x]/(1 -p)wah4}.
Assuming utility is state independent, y ,> yd and the difference increases

with p, B*, s*, x*, and Ehawa, the labor supply elasticity of the healthy.
Thus employer-provided insurance, where the cost is borne by a wage
offset when healthy, may be less than first best because of the wage offset
distorts labor supply. In principle, the employer could mitigate this by
specifying the number of hours required of healthy workers.
Optimal levels of accommodations, s* and x*, are inversely related to
hd*; x * is also inversely related to the number of disabled workers (Nd):

R = 1 /h and Rx = 1 /N dh.
G. Effects of Laws Requiring Equal Wages and
"Reasonable Accommodations"
It has been shown that, when labor supply elasticity is nonzero and
insurance is available, the optimal long-term contract implies that wage
rates of the healthy and disabled should differ in order to minimize the
excess burden of distortions in labor supply, which is borne by workers.
The disabled are paid their marginal product, conditional on revenuemaximizing investments in accommodations which the firm has every incentive to make. The healthy receive a wage that is less than their marginal
product in order to finance the expected nonwage costs of insurance and
accommodations in the event of disability.39 When long-term contracts
are not available, investments in accommodations are still at revenue-maximizing levels, but the incidence of the cost is on disabled workers.
If antidiscrimination statutes simply require wed = Wag clearly firms would
be unwilling to hire disabled workers as long as Rd(O, 0) < Ra. Even if
R d(s*, x*) = Ra and disabled workers were willing to bear the cost of
accommodations, they would be precluded from doing so by the equal
wage requirement, unless they could pay for the accommodations in cash.
" The results of the analysis are similar if there are three states of the world:
healthy; totally disabled, with insurance B and no work; and partially disabled, in
which case the worker may be rehired, and nonzero investments in accommodations
may be optimal.
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Thus simply mandating equal wages and that employers provide reasonable

accommodations would reduce employment opportunities for the disabled.
Not surprisingly, the 1990 ADA also bans discriminatory hiring. The
effect of the joint requirements of equal wages, reasonable accommodations,
and nondiscriminatory hiring is that Wa must fall and wd increases. This
distorts labor supply of both groups. If the government mandates w"d > Wad*
the optimal level of B is lower: dB*/dwd < 0. If B cannot be reducedfor example, because B is set by statute (either DI or workers' compensation)-then the reduction in w4 and resulting excess burden on workers
is greater than if B can be reduced.
The reduction in Wa required to meet the zero profit constraint depends
also on the interpretation of "reasonable accommodations" by the courts.
It has been shown that the optimal level of accommodations depends inversely on the average hours of work of the disabled and, for fixed costs,
on the number of disabled workers. Thus total social costs are minimized
if large firms specialize in hiring the disabled. Anecdotal evidence is con-

sistent with this assumption. The firms cited as being exemplary in their
hiring of disabled workers are all large (e.g., McDonalds). Conversely,
the National Federation of Independent Business, which represents small
firms, was more active than representatives of large firms in opposing the
1990 legislation. If small and large firms are held to similar definitions of
'reasonable accommodations,' this is equivalent to a tax on labor in small
firms. The incidence of this tax depends on the mobility of workers and
other factors in small firms. Further, requiring that all firms accommodate
the disabled clearly entails higher total social costs than if specialization
is permitted.
One of the claimed benefits for the 1990 act is that it will increase
employment of the disabled and thereby reduce the burden on social insurance and welfare programs. If the law simply imposed requirements
on employers that increase potential wage rates of the disabled, some increase in labor supply and employment of the disabled would be expected,
assuming positive supply elasticities, but with some reduction in labor
supply of the healthy. But the law also requires that all services and facilities
be accessible to the disabled. This will increase the productivity of nonmarket time and the real income of the disabled. Unless there is an offsetting
reduction in benefits paid under social insurance programs, income and
substitution effects away from market time could reduce labor supply and
hence increase the burden on social insurance programs.
Because many of the costs of accommodating the disabled in providing
services are fixed costs, regardless of the number of disabled actually using
the services, placing an accommodations requirement on all service providers entails an excessively high social cost of achieving a given level of
real income for the disabled. As in the case of employment, there are large
potential gains from specializing and large excess burdens from requiring
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universal and uniform accommodations. Offsetting these costs may be the
utility value to the disabled of equal access in all activities.40
It seems likely that many of the disabled would prefer the cash equivalent
of the social cost of providing universal access. However, the political
process appears to preclude this potentially more efficient solution. The

costs of mandating accommodations are hard to measure, and their incidence is very diffuse; politically, it is hard to favor "discrimination" against
the disabled. Conversely, raising benefit levels would require explicit appropriations in federal or state budgets. Providing political favors by mandating costs on the private sector is becoming a familiar pattern in this era
of tight government budget constraints. But the social costs, in terms of
excess burden per dollar of benefit to the disabled, may well be much
higher than under the explicit social insurance programs such as DI
and SSI.
V. Conclusions

Previous studies of disability insurance in the United States have focused
on the labor supply effects of the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI)
program. But other forms of social insurance-in particular, tort liability
and antidiscrimination legislation-are expanding more rapidly and may
have larger economic effects. Evaluation of the net welfare effect of DI
should include not only its labor supply effects but also its effects on
insurance and life-cycle redistribution of income. When all these factors
are considered, its net welfare cost, relative to the realistic alternative of
private insurance with imperfect information, may be quite low.
A model of optimal disability insurance, postinjury accommodations,
and labor supply shows that reduction in labor supply when disabled is
consistent with full information insurance and does not necessarily imply
moral hazard. However because utility may be higher when disabled, disability insurance creates incentives for fraudulent claims and excessive reduction in labor supply. If employers have better information than insurers
about true disability status, then employer-provided disability insurance
through long-term contracts may be superior to individually purchased
insurance.

If long-term employment contracts are enforceable, equal wages for the
healthy and the disabled are optimal only if labor supply of the healthy is
totally inelastic. When labor supply elasticity is nonzero, the optimal longterm contract pays the disabled their marginal product, conditional on
40 There may also be external effects; e.g., the value of wheelchair ramps inside
buildings is greater if the access roads also have ramps. Although these external
effects are not explicitly modeled, the general point applies that optimal investment

in accommodations that are public goods or have external effects is lower, the
lower the frequency of disabled in the population. Universal access requirements
are unlikely to be optimal.
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revenue-maximizing investments in accommodations. The healthy are paid
less than their marginal product in order to finance insurance benefits and
accommodations for the disabled. The wage differential between healthy
and disabled workers is increasing in the labor supply elasticity of healthy
workers, the probability of being disabled, insurance benefits for the disabled, and the optimal investment in accommodations. If accommodations
entail fixed costs, regardless of the number of disabled (e.g., wheelchair
ramps), the optimal investment in accommodations is positively related
to the number of disabled workers. Some specialization is therefore optimal,
with employment of the disabled concentrated in larger firms.
When long-term contracts are not available, investments in accommodations are still at revenue-maximizing levels, but the incidence of the cost
is on the disabled. Insurance is suboptimal if insurers cannot perfectly
monitor disability status, hours of work, and investment in accommodations by the disabled.
Antidiscrimination statutes that require employers to provide accommodations and pay equal wages would reduce employment opportunities
for the disabled. If discriminatory hiring is also banned, as it is by the
ADA, the wages of the healthy must fall, which will reduce their labor
supply. Wages for the disabled increase, but effects on their labor supply
are ambiguous because real income and the productivity of nonmarket
time are increased by the mandate that all services and facilities be accessible
to the disabled.

Because some accommodations are fixed costs, the ADA's universal access requirements imply a tax rate that varies inversely with size of firm
or service establishment. The incidence of this tax will be on immobile
factors in these firms and establishments. If the total social costs and the
incidence of the costs of this method of expanding insurance for the disabled
were explicit, it seems unlikely that it would be widely supported. However,
this conclusion is tentative because the analysis here has not considered
all possible effects of the ADA. Specific issues that should be addressed in
future analysis include its effects on discrimination, costs of litigating valid
and frivolous claims, and consumption and production externalites from
providing universal access for the disabled.
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